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Abstract: Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. 
Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, 
indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a 
cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in 
the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable 
solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail 
to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to being rejected 
by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize 
reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the 
most leading social norms we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes 
locally stable. 
Keywords: evolution of cooperation; indirect reciprocity; social norm; second-order free 
rider; pool punishment; replicator dynamics 
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Introduction 
Natural selection disfavours indirect reciprocity unless the costs of observation and 
assessment are negligible [1]. According to proper social norms that distinguish good from 
evil, such as image-scoring norm [2], indirect reciprocity can promote cooperation even in 
large populations [3]. However, making moral assessments takes time and effort. 
Discriminators who incur no assessment cost thus appear as free riders that erode a 
cooperative state achieved by discriminators who incur the costs. Despite the advance of 
indirect reciprocity, the crucial question remains unsolved [4]: How can cooperation through 
indirect reciprocity be maintained when considering the costs associated with the assessment 
system? 
To address this crucial question, we focus on the fact that this puzzling situation is 
closely related to the second-order free-rider problem in costly punishment [1]. The evolution 
of costly punishment, in striking contrast to indirect reciprocity, has been given much more 
attention over the last decades. In tackling the second-order free-rider problem, previous 
study significantly examined pool punishment [5-10]. The key aspect of pool punishment is 
its proactive mechanism to detect second-order free riders through unconditional pre-
payment. The mechanism paves the way for effectively punishing second-order free riders. 
In this paper we apply the essence of the pool-punishment mechanism to fix the issue 
of the costly moral assessment. In the next section, we introduce a basic model of indirect 
reciprocity and the known negative outcome from considering the assessment costs. In the 
Results section we show how adopting a proactive assessment mechanism can improve the 
outcome. 
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Materials and methods 
We build upon the standard framework for the evolution of indirect reciprocity by 
reputation [11,12]. Using the framework, a strategy for discriminators is given by an 
assessment rule combined with an action rule. We base indirect reciprocity on the giving 
game, which is a two-player game in which one player acts as a donor and the other a 
recipient. The donor can choose to help the recipient by giving benefits  b> 0 	  at personal cost 
 c > 0 	  or not to help. We consider the following implementation error: a player who has 
intended to help involuntarily fails to do so with a probability  e  [1,13]. 
We start with a basic model in which each individual is endowed with a binary image 
score of ‘good’ or ‘bad’. It is assumed that the discriminator’s action rule is to help a good 
recipient or not to help a bad recipient. After observing every giving game, a unique 
assessment system assigns the donor’s image by following a specific assessment rule. We 
assume that all discriminators share the same list of individual image scores provided by the 
assessment system. We later consider in particular the second-order assessment rule, which is 
a function of the donor’s last action and the recipient’s last image (Table 1).  
To study the evolution of discriminators, we respect a continuous-entry model: an 
individual’s birth and death sometimes happen, and this changes the strategy distribution in 
the population [14]. We assume that in one’s lifetime an individual infinitely plays the one-
round giving game with different opponents. We consider infinitely large populations and 
analyse the replicator dynamics [15] for the following four strategies: 1) Paying discriminator 
[Z] is willing to help a good recipient and refuses to help a bad recipient in the giving game. 
Also s/he is willing to pay for the assessment cost  k > 0 . 2) Evading discriminator [W] 
similarly acts as a paying discriminator in the giving game, except that s/he is not willing to 
pay for the assessment cost. 3) Cooperator [X] unconditionally intends to help a potential 
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recipient, and 4) Defector [Y] unconditionally intends not to help a potential recipient. Both 
cooperator and defector are not willing to pay for the assessment cost. We denote by  x ,  y , 
 z  and  w  the frequencies of cooperators, defectors and paying and evading discriminators, 
respectively. The replicator dynamics for these strategies are described as  dn dt =n(PS −P) , 
where  n  is the frequency of strategy  S  (= X, Y, Z, W),  PS  is the expected payoff given by 
the limit in the mean of the payoff per round for strategy  S  and  P  is the average payoff over 
the population, given by  xPX + yPY + zPZ + wPW . 
To formalize the expected payoffs, we denote by  gS  the probability that a recipient 
with strategy  S  is helped by a given discriminator. In the basic model this is identical to the 
fraction of good players within all  S  strategists. Let  g  be the population average of  gS , thus 
 g = xgX + ygY + zgZ + wgW . The population size is very large, so we may assume that the 
population configuration for  gS  does not change between the consecutive one-round giving 
games [16]. Thus, the expected payoffs are described as  
 
PX = (1−e)b[x + gX (z + w)]−(1−e)c,
PY = (1−e)b[x + gY (z + w)],
PZ = (1−e)b[x + gZ (z + w)]−(1−e)cg−k,
PW = (1−e)b[x + gW (z + w)]−(1−e)cg.
       (1) 
We note that in the basic model either paying or evading discriminators intend to help 
a potential recipient who has a good image, thus leading to  gZ = gW . This results in paying 
discriminators being worse off than evading discriminators. Substituting this into Eq. (1) 
yields 
 PZ −PW =−k < 0.            (2) 
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For any degree of the assessment cost  k , evading discriminators dominate paying 
discriminators in the interior state space, and thus the population in the end attains a state that 
excludes paying discriminators. In the absence of cost payers, the assessment system cannot 
be established. Consequently, cooperation in that case would vanish without discrimination.  
Results 
The basic model reveals that considering cost evaders destabilizes indirect reciprocity 
irrespective of the assessment rule, as shown in previous work [1]. To stabilize indirect 
reciprocity, we examine an institutional variant of the basic model. As a first step, we extend 
the basic model to a two-stage game in which one round consists of the stage of payment for 
the observation costs followed by the stage of the giving game, which is the same as in the 
basic model. The first stage offers an opportunity to transfer some fees to a central account as 
in automatic utility payments. 
The essential idea is to specifically assess the second-order free rider. We consider a 
different binary moral code ‘nice’ or ‘nasty’. The (unique) assessment system assigns a nice 
image to an individual if s/he pays the costs in the first stage, otherwise that individual is 
assigned a nasty image. In evaluating the donor’s action of the giving game, as the first step 
we simply apply the existing assessment framework to the second stage, as in the basic model. 
We keep the four strategies, cooperators, defectors, paying discriminators and evading 
discriminators, as before and assume that in the first stage, paying discriminators are willing 
to pay but the remaining cooperators, defectors and evading discriminators are not. We also 
modify the discriminator’s action rule for the giving game as follows: either paying or 
evading discriminators give help if a potential recipient has a good and nice image, or 
otherwise (if bad or nasty), refuse help. 
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The extra assessment by the utilities payment system seriously lowers the image score 
for second-order free riders. For analytical simplicity, we assume that the utilities payment 
system is so perfect that no assessment error occurs for the first stage. All of evading 
strategies: cooperators, defectors and evading discriminators (X, Y and W), therefore, are 
necessarily assessed as nasty. This yields  gX = gY = gW = 0 . (Note that in the variant,  gS  
equals the probability of good and nice players.) Thus, Eq. (1) becomes  
 
PX = (1−e)bx−(1−e)c,
PY = (1−e)bx,
PZ = (1−e)b[x + gZ (z + w)]−(1−e)cgZ z−k,
PW = (1−e)bx−(1−e)cgZ z.
       (3) 
It is clear that  PY ≥ PW ≥ PX . To understand when the homogeneous state of paying 
discriminators  z =1  becomes locally stable, it is enough to check if  PZ −PY > 0  in the 
vicinity of  z =1  on the face  x = w = 0 . This yields 
 PZ −PY = (1−e)(b−c)gZ z−k.        (4) 
With suitable assessment rules, it is possible to have that  gZ > 0  in the vicinity of  z =1. In 
this case, the node  z =1  turns into a locally stable equilibrium when the net benefit  b−c  is 
sufficiently large compared to the assessment cost  k .  
Finally, we demonstrate how the variant improves the results for some of the most 
leading assessment rules. We examine simple standing [13,16] and stern judging [17], the 
only two second-order assessment rules in the leading eight norms [10,11]. According to the 
discriminator’s action rule in the variant, we extend simple standing and stern judging as in 
table 1. These rules assign a good image to those who help a good and nice recipient with no 
implementation error (probability  (1−e)g ) and also a good image to those who refuse to 
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help a bad or nasty recipient (probability  1−g ). By assumption of the image dynamics, the 
sum of these probabilities should equal  gZ . Considering also  g = gZ z  then leads to the 
recursive equation for  gZ ,  gZ = (1−e)gZ z + (1−gZ z) . This yields  gZ =1/ (1+ ez) . Hence, 
the necessary and sufficient condition for the homogeneous state of paying discriminators 
( z =1) to be locally stable either under the simple-standing or stern-judging rule is  
 
1−e
1+ e
(b−c)−k > 0.            (5) 
Figure 1a shows the basin of attraction for  z =1 , and figure 1b depicts the flow on the 
boundary faces of the state space under simple standing. If we assume assessment errors in 
the first stage, the image dynamics become more complicated but the main results remain 
qualitatively unchanged—paying discriminators can stabilise with the pre-assessment of cost 
evaders (electronic supplementary material, S1). 
Discussion  
Since the definitive 2013 work by Suzuki and Kimura [1], the evolution of indirect 
reciprocity relying on costly assessment systems has been explicitly recognized as one of the 
inevitable issues that challenge the advance of indirect reciprocity [4]. To address the issue, 
we considered a simple pre-assessment mechanism that is set prior to the primary game in 
order to detect and label cost evaders. We then demonstrated that the mechanism considered 
leads to stabilizing costly indirect reciprocity under the most leading social norms, simple 
standing and stern judging.  
Our results are potentially applicable to a broad range of existing indirect reciprocity 
models, such as tolerant scoring [18], group scoring [19], reputation-based punishment [20], 
mixed public and private interactions [21], optional interactions [22] and finite populations 
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[23]. On the one hand, managing more complicated assessment systems, such as in [18-21], 
would be more costly, and thus it is worth considering pre-assessment mechanisms for 
reducing the temptation to evade cost sharing. On the other hand, as in the case of pool 
punishment [8], jointly considering optional interactions [22] and finite populations [23] 
might facilitate establishing pre-assessment mechanisms.  
Another promising avenue for future studies would be to explore costly indirect 
reciprocity on more realistic structured populations. Recent studies using structured 
populations suggest the importance of cooperator assortment based on reputation [24, 25]. 
However, little is known about how information cost affects reputation-based reciprocity on a 
network. In the case of the second-order free-rider problem in costly punishment, considering 
the locality of interactions among players can solve the problem by separating costly 
punishers from second-order free riders [26]. Similarly, the extension to structured 
populations may lead to significantly different outcomes for paying and evading 
discriminators. 
We left out an advanced issue of analysing nonlinking discriminators [27] who act as 
paying discriminators yet are willing to help cost evaders with a good image. Nonlinking 
discriminators can invade paying discriminators by neutral drift. The preliminary results 
indicate that considering implementation or assessment errors for the first stage can lead 
paying discriminators to become better off than nonlinking ones, as in fixing neutral drift 
between conditional and unconditional cooperators [13]. Further investigation is planned in 
future work.  
We note that prepayment for assessment systems can be viewed as a kind of 
contribution to collective action. Thus, our results corroborate those of previous studies on 
two-stage games in which reciprocal behaviours in the second stage are linked to a collective 
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action in the first stage. For instance, Panchanathan and Boyd showed that collective action 
in the first stage can be maintained by considering a shunning strategy that in the second 
stage withholds help for those who failed to contribute in the first stage [28]. Together, the 
present results further imply that such a proactive social mechanism that can discriminate 
those who deserve to enter social exchange and reciprocal norms within social exchange may 
evolve jointly. 
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Table caption 
Table 1. How second-order rules make moral assessments in giving games with pre-
assessment. ‘G’ and ‘B’ describe a good and bad image, respectively. In the donor’s action, 
‘C’ and ‘D’ describe giving help and refusing help, respectively.  
Figure caption 
Figure 1. Pre-assessment of cost evaders stabilizes costly indirect reciprocity. (a) The 
tetrahedron describes a simplex of the state space  {(x, y, z,w) : x + y + z + w =1;x, y, z,w≥0}. 
Each corner corresponds to the homogeneous state of each specific strategy. The basin of 
attraction for paying discriminators covers approx. 61.5% of the whole space. (b) The flow 
diagrams depict the direction of evolution on the boundary faces of the state-space simplex. 
The state space has no interior equilibrium, and all interior orbits converge to the boundary. 
Any mixed state of defectors and evading discriminators forms an equilibrium point on the 
edge  y + w =1 . Parameters:  c =1 ,  b =1.5 ,  e = 0.01 ,  k = 0.3 , and simple-standing rule.
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Table 
Conditions 
Recipient’s image G and nice G and nice B or nasty B or nasty 
Donor’s action C D C D 
Assessment rule: 
What does donor’s 
image look like? 
Simple standing G B G G 
Stern judging G B B G 
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Figure 
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Electronic supplementary material for: 
Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems  
on costly moral assessment 
Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada, Yutaka Nakai 
S1. Simple standing and stern judging with first-stage assessment errors 
We examine assessment errors for the first stage of the variant model considered in 
the main text. We explore the conditions for the homogeneous state of paying discriminators 
[Z] with z = 1 to become stable under simple standing and stern judging. We check when 
paying discriminators become better off than the other three strategies: cooperators, defectors 
and evading discriminators.  
First, we analyse the frequency of good and nice players among S-strategists (S = X, 
Y, Z or W),  gS . As in the main text, we assume that the degree of  gS  is unchanged between 
the consecutive one-round (two-stage) games. We note that by definition the only difference 
between the rules is with respect to how a potential donor is to be assessed when a potential 
recipient is bad or nasty and the donor’s action is not to help, in which case simple standing 
assigns a good image and stern judging a bad image.  
We denote by  e1  the probability of a first-stage assessment error in which the 
assessment system involuntarily assesses a paying player (who should have been nice) as 
nasty or an evading player (who should have been nasty) as nice. 
For simple standing,  gS  is given by 
 
gX = e1[(1−e2 )g + (1−g)],
gY = e1[0 ⋅g + (1−g)],
gZ = (1−e1)[(1−e2 )g + (1−g)],
gW = e1[(1−e2 )g + (1−g)],
        (S1) 
in which  g  denotes the frequency of players who have both a good and nice image over the 
whole population, thus  g = xgX + ygY + zgZ + wgW , and  e2  describes the probability of an 
implementation error in the second stage (see the main text for details). In equation (S1), the 
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evading players (with X, Y or W) and the paying players (with Z) are assessed as nice with 
probability  e1  and  1−e1 , respectively, in the first stage. In addition, the bracket terms of the 
right side describe the probability that a donor with strategy S is assessed as good in the 
second-stage giving game. When a recipient has a good and nice image (with probability  g ), 
X, Z and W strategists are willing to help and are assessed as good with probability  (1−e2 )g  
and Y strategists refuse to help, thus receiving a bad image. Simple standing is a tolerant 
norm, which is to assign a good image to a donor, irrespective of his/her actions to a recipient 
who has a bad or nasty image. This leads to the same second term in the bracket as  1−g  
over all  gS . 
Then, for stern judging, equation (S1) becomes 
 
gX = e1[(1−e2 )g + e2(1−g)],
gY = e1[0 ⋅g + (1−g)],
gZ = (1−e1)[(1−e2 )g + (1−g)],
gW = e1[(1−e2 )g + (1−g)].
        (S2) 
Stern judging assigns a good image to those who refuse to help a bad or nasty recipient and a 
bad image to those who help a bad or nasty recipient. This leads to the second term in the 
bracket for  gX ,  e2(1−g) , which is the only difference from simple standing in equation (S1). 
We analyse the expected payoff  PS  at the point  z =1. Equation (1) in the main text is 
specified as: 
 
PX = (1−e2 )bgX −(1−e2 )c,
PY = (1−e2 )bgY ,
PZ = (1−e2 )bgZ −(1−e2 )cg−k,
PW = (1−e2 )bgW −(1−e2 )cg.
        (S3)  
Considering equations (S1) to (S3), it is obvious that  PW  is greater than or equal to  PX . Thus, 
if 
 
PZ −PW z=1 > 0  holds, this yields  
PZ −PX z=1 > 0 .  
By solving equations (S1) and (S2) for z = 1, we obtain, in either case of simple 
standing or stern judging, 
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g
z=1
= gZ z=1 =
1−e1
1+ e2(1−e1)
.        (S4) 
Substituting equation (S4) into equations (S1) to (S3) yields 
 
PZ −PY z=1 =
b(1−e2 )[1−(1+ e2 )e1−(1−e2 )e1
2]−c(1−e1)(1−e2 )
1+ e2(1−e1)
−k,    (S5) 
and 
 
PZ −PW z=1 =
b(1−e2 )(1−2e1)
1+ e2(1−e1)
−k.         (S6) 
Equations (S5) and (S6) (which give the stability threshold conditions) for  z =1 are common 
throughout simple standing and stern judging.  
As the degree of the first-stage assessment error  e1  goes to 0, equations (S5) and (S6) 
converge to 
 
1−e2
1+ e2
(b−c)−k  and 
 
1−e2
1+ e2
b−k , respectively. Therefore, equation (5) in the 
main text, 
 
1−e2
1+ e2
(b−c)−k > 0,  
is sufficient for  z =1 to also be stable for a sufficiently small degree of  e1  in either case of 
simple standing or stern judging.  
